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This paper explores the distributional consequences of technological change on mid-
skilled routine workers in Switzerland in three steps: (1) The first part studies 
aggregate trends in the labor market and confirms the pattern of an eroding middle: 
The disadvantages of technological progress are concentrated on routine workers 
whose share in the labor force has drastically declined over time. (2) In order to 
better understand the economic conditions associated with this overall pattern, the 
second part draws on individual-level panel data to study actual employment 
transitions. The analysis shows that transitions are less frequent than the aggregate 
pattern might suggest: Only a minority of routine workers actually switches to other 
jobs while the largest chunk of the decline is explained by ‘natural transitions’ into 
retirement. (3) The last part of the paper builds on original survey data to examine 
routine workers’ subjective assessment of their chances in a changing world of work 
and demonstrates a surprisingly high degree of consciousness about susceptibility to 
automation. To conclude, I discuss some societal implications of the ‘hollowing of 
the middle’. 
Keywords: Employment Polarization, Automation, Technological Change, Routine 
Work, Hollowing of the Middle, Panel Data, Switzerland 
 
Introduction 
The political economies of the developed world are today on the cusp of a profound trans-
formation of labor markets. The most important factor behind long-term occupational change 
is technology (Manning 2003; Oesch 2013). Rapid advances in automation and computeriza-
tion push us into a new era where many existing skills and competencies become increasingly 
redundant. It should thus not come as a surprise that these rapid improvements in technolog-
ical possibilities have sparked a lively public and scientific debate on their impact on labor 
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markets and employment opportunities. While some pioneering studies attracted a lot of at-
tention with alarmingly high estimates of job replacement (e.g. Frey/Osborne 2013, 2017), the 
literature more recently has painted a less pessimistic picture of overall employment effects 
(Arntz et al. 2016; Autor/Salomons 2018). In a new working paper, Gregory et al. (2019) even 
suggest that new technologies result in a net gain in jobs since positive side effects on the pric-
es of tradable goods create labor demand that outweighs direct substitution effects. 
Technological change has important distributive implications due to its highly heteroge-
neous impact on different occupations. In a seminal contribution to the literature, Autor et al. 
(2003) established that computers tend to complement workers in non-routine jobs whereas 
they substitute workers in routine jobs. Routine tasks are understood as activities that follow a 
given protocol or a set of explicit rules. Computers are a very powerful competitor to humans 
as long as the required rules are standardized, that is, codifiable, and can subsequently be ap-
plied in a repetitive way. It is important to emphasize that routine work should not be mistak-
en for low-skilled work. Exactly because of the initial effort to learn and get acquainted with a 
possibly broad and complex set of rules, most routine jobs require a certain level of education 
and/or vocational training and are thus located in the (lower) middle of the education and 
income distribution. Many blue-collar jobs, e.g. mining plant operators or textile machine 
operators, belong to this category but also a significantly large part of basic white-collar work 
in administration or accounting. 
Much in contrast, many low-pay jobs have so far been less susceptible to automation de-
spite lower skill requirements to enter these jobs. Again, this is due to the task content of such 
jobs, which might be characterized by lower complexity but also lower levels of routineness. In 
contemporary labor markets, most low-skill work is found in personal services, which often 
require personal interaction, flexibility due to customer contact, or “hand-eye coordination" 
(Manning 2003). Examples include security guards, travel stewards, pet groomers, or – at least 
up to now – services related to personal transportation. While trivial for most humans, such 
simple non-routine manual tasks are difficult to codify in static protocols and thus harder to 
automate. 
Finally, jobs that combine specialized skills with non-routine tasks are least susceptible to 
automation. Non-routine cognitive jobs are characterized by a heavy emphasis on analytical 
capabilities and problem-solving skills and usually require a higher degree. Jobs with a mana-
gerial function belong to this category but also most employees in teaching, research and de-
velopment, medical practitioners or workers in the creative industry, among others. 
The realization that automation and digitalization affect labor demand on the basis of the 
task-content rather than the skill-content of a job has important distributive consequences. 
The traditional skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz/Autor 1999; 
Goldin/Katz 2009) expects workers’ benefits from technology to increase with their skill-level, 
which results in the prediction of a general upgrading of the employment structure over time. 
The more nuanced routine-biased technological change (RBTC) hypothesis (Autor et al. 2003; 
Goos/Manning 2007; Goos et al. 2014), in contrast, predicts a polarization of the labor force 
due to the decline in mid-skilled routine jobs and the growth in both low-skilled and high-
skilled non-routine jobs. 
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Conceptualization of Task Groups 
The following sections aim to empirically underpin the conjecture of widespread job po-
larization. I follow the aforementioned approach introduced by Autor et al. (2003), which 
classifies occupations into three conceptually distinct groups according to the bundle of tasks 
that characterize a job. A task-based approach centers around the task profile of every single 
occupation. Two different strategies have been used to the end of classifying jobs into task-
based categories (see, e.g., Aeppli et al. 2017: p. 42f). On the one hand, labor market experts 
have created specific and very detailed job databases, which build on various sources such as 
labor contracts, collective agreements or descriptions of advanced vocational training courses. 
Arguably the most well-known and most often used database is the Dictionary of Occupation-
al Titles (DOT) and its successor O*NET, which contains a rich set of variables to describe 
both work and worker characteristics. On the other hand, a survey-based approach asks re-
spondents directly about the task content of their jobs. In any case, labor market experts can 
then use these detailed descriptions to categorize jobs into broader groups according to their 
task profile, or, more precisely, according to the dominating set of tasks that describes an oc-
cupation. 
 
Figure 1: Wage Level by Task Group.  
 
 
Source: Swiss Household Panel, 1999-2016 
 
I largely rely on Daniel Oesch’s (2013: p. 156) grouping that classifies occupations into six 
task groups (non-routine service, non-routine manual, routine cognitive, routine manual, 
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non-routine analytical, and non-routine interactive) but collapse the two subgroups within 
each of the three aforementioned major task groups in order to comply with simplified stand-
ard classification in labor economics (Autor et al. 2003). Table A1 provides all details of the 
final grouping.2 
The resulting three task groups (non-routine manual, routine, non-routine cognitive) are 
conceptually distinct in that they are (1) dominated by either non-routine or routine tasks and 
that they (2) vary in skill requirement. The two aspects combined yield a rough ordinal group-
ing in terms of occupational prestige and job quality with non-routine manual jobs at the bot-
tom, routine jobs in the middle and non-routine cognitive jobs at the top. Figure 1 provides 
empirical evidence for this rank order by plotting the development of each task groups’ medi-
an wage level, a frequent proxy for an ordinal measure of job quality (see, e.g., Goos/Manning 
2007; Oesch 2013).3 The rank order with respect to earnings is very clear-cut and stable over 
time. Kurer (2017) shows that the notion of routine workers being in the middle of the occu-
pational structure also holds for other worker characteristics, most importantly skill level, and 
is robust beyond Switzerland since very similar patterns emerge in Germany and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Employment Polarization Across Europe4 
Before zooming in on Switzerland, this section provides a broad cross-national overview 
over changes in the employment structure across Europe. Empirical evidence indeed strongly 
supports the prediction of increasing job polarization. Figure 2 shows relative changes in em-
ployment since the mid-1990s across Europe (Kurer/Palier 2019). While distinct institutional 
set-ups create different shapes of the employment structure, leading to more or less pro-
nounced patterns of polarization (Fernandez-Macias 2012), the hollowing of the middle is 
strikingly consistent. Growing job opportunities at both ends of the skill- and earnings distri-
bution are accompanied by a strong decline in routine work in each and every country cov-
ered by the data. Acknowledging the fact that job growth in high-skilled non-routine jobs 
outweighs the increase in low-skilled non-routine jobs, one might describe the displayed evo-
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Figure 2: Aggregate Employment Changes – Cross-National Perspective: 
 
 
Source: Kurer/Palier 2019 
 
Note: Country-specific changes are share of labor force in 2017 minus share in first available 
year (varying, most countries between 1992 and 1998, BG = 2000, HR = 2002). Task groups are 
classified based on ISCO-1d codes. Non-routine manual = Service and Sales Workers; Elemen-
tary Occupations. Routine = Clerical Support Workers; Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fish-
ery Workers; Craft and Related Trade Workers; Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers. 
Non-Routine Cognitive = Managers; Professionals; Technicians and Associate Professionals. 
Bars are population-weighted average changes across countries. Data source: Eurostat. 
Technological Change and Routine Work in Switzerland 
The following analysis of routine workers’ labor market prospects in Switzerland addresses 
the following questions: (1) Does the evolution of the aggregate employment structure resem-
ble the cross-national pattern shown above? (2) Where do (former) routine workers end up 
and what is the relative frequency of different labor market transitions? (3) Are routine work-
ers aware of increasingly bleak labor market prospects? 
Aggregate Patterns 
The first step of the empirical analysis replicates the aggregate patterns shown in the introduc-
tion for the Swiss case with better data and a more fine-grained classification of occupations 
into the three task groups. Figure 3 displays relative changes in employment shares between 
1999 and 2016 based on the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) and confirms both a strong decline 
in routine work and a similarly strong growth in high-skilled non-routine cognitive jobs. In 
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contrast to other European countries, at least since 1999, Switzerland has not seen an expan-
sion in low pay and low-skill non-routine manual jobs (for similar findings based on different 
data and time spans, see Oesch/Rodriguez-Menes 2011; Nathani et al. 2017). This is a likely 
consequence of the comparatively high cost of labor, which makes services provided by non-
routine manual workers expensive and limits the demand for such jobs.5 
 
Figure 3: Aggregate Employment Changes – Switzerland 
 
 
Source: Swiss Household Panel, 1999-2016 
 
Coming back to the two initially discussed theoretical approaches, it appears that neither 
perfectly explains this pattern but that a combination of skill- and task-based explanations fits 
best. While the RBTC hypothesis correctly predicts the pronounced decline in routine work, 
the expectation of a growth in all kinds of non-routine jobs, including low-skilled ones, is not 
met. At the same time, the SBTC hypothesis is correct in its expectation that high skills are 
complements to new technology but fails to explain the relatively larger decline in mid-skilled 
as opposed to low-skilled jobs. 
                                                     
5 A recent Financial Times article provided a nice illustration of the consequences of differential labor cost on the de-
mand for non-routine manual work by discussing differences in the art of car maintenance between the US and Norway 
(Sandbu 2019). While human car washers are abundant in the US, this kind of work has ceased to exist in Norway a long time 
ago. Norwegians either wash their cars in automated car-wash centers – or do the job themselves. The level of wages, especial-
ly at the lower end of the income distribution, determines how economical automation is. At the same time, automation 
increases productivity and, thus, wages. The second aspect is wage compression: the more equal wages are, “the less point 
there is in paying others to carry out such tasks for you" (Sandbu 2019). The demand for less skilled work thus depends on 
unskilled wages relative to skilled ones as well as on the relative cost of automation. 
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Individual Occupational Transitions 
While the strong increase in high skill and high pay jobs is certainly good news for the devel-
opment of the Swiss employment structure, the persistent decrease of routine jobs is a source 
of concern. It confronts a shrinking but still sizable and relevant share of the labor force with 
increasingly bleak prospects in the labor markets of tomorrow. Despite their continuous de-
cline, according to the Swiss Household Panel, routine workers still accounted for about a 
fourth of the Swiss labor force in 2017. 
The societal consequences of the decline in routine work strongly depend on routine 
workers’ exit options out of the squeezed middle. The implications of the hollowing of the 
middle are very different depending on whether routine workers leave their jobs for the better, 
e.g. high-paid work in growing non-routine cognitive jobs, or the worse, e.g. low-paid jobs in 
personal services or, even inferior, unemployment. 
In order to better understand the societal implications of the decline in routine work 
and get beyond pure compositional effects, in this section I examine individual-level employ-
ment trajectories. Sticking to the task-based approach provides a parsimonious framework 
with a straightforward universe of occupational transitions. The focus is on those respondents 
in the SHP who at the beginning of the observed period hold a routine job. The three distinct 
task groups thus offer three different trajectories, which I call upgrading (routine → non- rou-
tine cognitive), surviving (routine → routine), and downgrading (routine → non-routine man-
ual), respectively. In addition, routine workers might drop out of the labor force (routine → 
unemployment) or reach pension age (routine → retirement). 
For each respondent, I code the occupational status in the first and last observation 
captured by the SHP. The coding necessarily results in varying time spans between the first 
and last observation per respondent. By design, the resulting transition matrix is a weighted 
average of different time spans with a mean duration of slightly below five years. Evaluating 
different sub-samples of respondents with different time spans demonstrates that within-labor 
market transitions are relatively stable over time and transition probabilities increase only 
slightly. The obvious exception is the transition into retirement, which naturally becomes 
more likely with longer time spans of observation, i.e. increasing age of respondents.6 
Figure 4 displays the resulting transition pattern in an alluvial plot, where routine workers’ 
transitions are highlighted in green. The most striking aspect of the figure is the large share of 
survivors: More than two out of three routine workers cling to their jobs despite the strong 
aggregate decline of this task group. Regarding transitions between task groups, the plot 
shows that about every tenth routine worker manages to upgrade into the growing sector of 
high-skilled non-routine cognitive work. Even though these jobs often require tertiary de-
grees, they are apparently not entirely unreachable for routine workers who often lack this 
educational background. A slightly smaller share of 7.1% is forced out of routine work but 
able to find non-routine manual employment, which usually is lower paid work in the service 
sector. In contrast to what aggregate numbers might suggest at first sight, only a very small 
minority ends up unemployed. Finally, the most frequent transition is the one into retirement. 
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Table A2 in the Appendix shows the full transition matrix and allows for a comparison of 
relative likelihoods of switching between different task groups and exit options. 
 
Figure 4: Individual Transition Pattern – Switzerland  
Source: Swiss Household Panel, 1999-2016 
 
The examination of individual occupational transitions adds important nuance to the 
aggregate pattern discussed before. Despite the gradual decline of routine jobs, most affected 
workers manage to either stay in their jobs until retirement or are able to find alternative solu-
tions within the labor market. The most powerful driver behind the decline in routine work is 
thus natural turnover over cohorts or generations. A large majority exits routine work in non- 
traumatic ways, most often via (early) retirement, while young labor market entrants do not 
seem to replace them in similar numbers (see Cortes 2016; Kurer/Gallego 2019 for similar 
analyses on the U.S. and the United Kingdom). 
Taken together, while those roughly 10% of routine workers who are forced to down-
grade or even end up unemployed as a consequence of technological change are certainly a 
reason for concern, an overwhelming majority does not face an immediate deterioration of 
socio-economic conditions despite an occupational environment of structural decline. One 
important reason is certainly that some of the replacement has taken place before the time 
span under consideration, which creates positive selection effects for the remaining routine 
workers who are arguably more specialized and less susceptible to automation. Another rea-
son explaining this pattern is that work as well as workers themselves change and adapt over 
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time. Arntz et al. (2016) have made the important argument that the undoubted disappear-
ance of routine tasks does not always and necessarily mean that routine jobs disappear but 
that these jobs’ task content changes in a process of adjusting to automation. This is why 
Arntz and colleagues, in stark contrast to the sensational study by Frey/Osborne (2017), arrive 
at less pessimistic estimates of the share of jobs that will disappear as a consequence to techno-
logical innovation. 
Subjective Perceptions 
This last empirical section examines the final link between structural changes of the economy 
and individual well-being by bringing in subjective perceptions. While the previous sections 
have established the aggregate pattern of a hollowing of the middle as well as the underlying 
transition patterns, this section asks to which degree objective risk and the subjective sense of 
insecurity are aligned. Do routine workers realize that they are in an insecure position with 
regard to their future in the labor market and to what extent are they concerned about this 
situation? Technological change transforms the employment structure in a very gradual way, 
raising the question of how aware routine workers are about their increasingly bleak prospects 
in labor markets. Subjective perceptions are an important piece to assess how survivors in 
routine work might react to the threats of automation and, therefore, to better understand the 
societal consequences of technological change. If labor market stagnation and bleak prospects 
create discontent and status anxiety, routine workers in the lower middle class might accumu-
late behaviorally relevant grievances despite the relative stability in socio-economic condi-
tions. 
Existing survey data hardly ever involves specific questions on perceived risk of auto-
mation and attitudes towards technological change. A single notable exception is a study by 
Dekker et al. (2017) who examine attitudes towards robots at the workplace. More general 
questions about individual perceptions of susceptibility to automation are scarce in survey 
research. In order to fill this lacuna, I cooperated with the research institute gfs.bern and 
Credit Suisse to add an item battery on technological change to the 2018 “Worry Barometer"7 
Firstly, we asked respondents directly about their guess of how likely it is that a job like theirs 
will be automated by the means of new technology within the next ten years.8 Secondly, we 
added various questions about respondents attitudes towards new technology. For this paper, 
I focus on two specific questions, one asking about whether respondents believe that new 
technologies generally decrease their chances on labor markets and one asking whether re-
spondents feel overwhelmed by technological change in general. The answers are recorded on 




                                                     
7 With the Worry Barometer, Credit Suisse aims to contribute to the public debate on issues of socio-political relevance. 
Between July 10 and August 6, 2018, the research institute gfs.bern asked 2’551 voters across Switzerland about their concerns 
on behalf of Credit Suisse. For details, see the following link to the executive summary: Worry Barometer 2018. 
8 The original wording in German is: “Wie hoch schätzen Sie die Wahrscheinlichkeit (0-100), dass ihre Arbeitsstelle in 
den nächsten zehn Jahren durch einen Roboter, neue Technologie oder intelligente Software automatisiert wird?" 
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Figure 5: Subjective risk of automation (Distribution) – Switzerland  
 
 
Source: Worry Barometer 2018. N=1350 
 
Let us first look at subjective perceptions of susceptibility to automation among the 
three task groups. The following two visualizations provide evidence that routine workers’ 
objectively high exposure to new technology is indeed reflected in subjective risk perceptions. 
Figure 5 shows grouped densities of respondents’ probability estimates that their own job will 
be replaced by machines in the near future. Many respondents are not very concerned, result-
ing in modes close to the low end of the probability scale for all three task groups. However, 
the density distributions clearly differ between groups: the large majority of high-skilled non-
routine cognitive workers can be found in estimates of lower than 10% replacement probabil-
ity, while the estimates of non-routine manual workers and, especially, routine workers are 
less concentrated in the low-risk region. 
Figure 6 visualizes the same data in a different way by showing mean values of subjec-
tively perceived risks of automation by group. On average, respondents estimate the likeli-
hood of being replaced by robots or smart software in the near future at 24.5%, a remarkably 
high value given the relatively narrow time window of ten years. As expected, routine workers 
do have the highest average estimates but low-skilled non-routine manual workers’ concerns 
are almost as pronounced. The mean values of these two groups are not statistically distinct 
based on conventional levels of significance. A likely explanation is that much of the public 
debate around technological change focuses on substitution processes in the future, e.g. self-
driving cars, which will primarily affect low-skilled jobs that have so far been spared from 
automation. Accordingly, many low-skilled non-routine workers have been heavily primed by 
the media and may, unfortunately, be correct in their assessment of suffering from a similar 
risk of automation as routine workers in coming years. In contrast, and in line with theoretical 
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expectations, workers in non-routine cognitive jobs are considerably less concerned about 
their risk of being replaced by new technology. 
 
Figure 6: Subjective risk of automation (Average) – Switzerland  
 
 
Source: Worry Barometer 2018. N=1350. 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
Similar levels of concern about the risk of automation among low-skilled non-routine 
workers and mid-skilled routine workers are also reflected in more specific attitudes towards 
technological change. Figure 7 shows the share of respondents affirming (agree/strongly 
agree) two negative sentiments towards technological innovation by task group. The left panel 
shows reactions to a question specifically asking about the impact of technology on respond-
ents’ labor market prospects, while the panel on the right plots answers to a more general 
question asking about whether respondents commonly feel overwhelmed by technological 
change. 
Negative assessments of how technology affects workers’ chances in the labor markets 
of the future are very widespread. Exactly 50% of the sample voice concerns, whereby the level 
of agreement decreases with skill level. But even among high-skilled non-routine cognitive 
workers almost every second respondent thinks that technology decreases his/her prospects at 
the workplace. A similar pattern on a lower level is observable for the more general question 
about commonly feeling overwhelmed by developments related to technological innovation. 
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Figure 7: Attitudes towards Technological Change – Switzerland 
 
Source: Worry Barometer 2018. N=840 (left panel) and N=868 (right panel). 95% Confidence 
Intervals. 
 
Taken together, the evidence on subjective perceptions adds important shades to ob-
jective changes on labor markets. While the labor market data clearly shows that routine 
workers have been hit hardest by technological change, resulting in a strong decline of mid-
skilled jobs over time, subjective concerns seem to be influenced at least as much by expecta-
tions about the future. In that sense, it is perfectly reasonable that lower skilled, non-routine 
manual workers show similar or even higher levels of concern than routine workers since 
much of the public and scientific debate has emphasized the need for specialized skills to 
thrive in an increasingly automated world of work. 
Conclusion 
This article has traced the fate of mid-skilled routine workers, who are particularly 
susceptible to automation, in Switzerland. Analogously to other advanced societies, the empir-
ical evidence clearly shows a strong decline in routine jobs over the past 20 years. An analysis 
of individual-level panel data then decomposes the compositional effect and demonstrates 
that the aggregate decline does not result in mass unemployment among affected workers. 
Most routine workers manage to cling to their job but are not replaced once they retire. How-
ever, this survival in an environment of structural decline puts considerable strain on routine 
workers. Data on subjective perceptions from the 2018 Worry Barometer complement the 
analysis of objective labor market data and shows that a considerable share fears replacement 
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by a non-human competitor in the next ten years and more than every second routine worker 
believes that new technologies decrease their labor market prospects. 
The results are open to interpretation. On the positive side, the analysis shows that the 
dramatic decrease in routine work does not go hand in hand with a widespread deterioration 
of socio-economic conditions. Most routine workers find a non-traumatic exit out of the 
squeezed middle either via retirement or a transition into different, less exposed occupations. 
Superficially considered, such a relatively smooth transformation of labor markets in times of 
automation might not suggest drastic societal repercussions. 
However, there are a few reasons for concern. First of all, the analysis of subjective per-
ceptions has shown that surviving in routine work is not exactly a comfortable position but 
comes with considerable levels of strain. Recent research has shown that status anxiety related 
to occupational change and structural decline is a powerful driver of political discontent 
(Gidron/Hall 2017; Kurer 2017). Even if the decrease in routine work is a gradual and on the 
individual level often non-traumatic process, relative changes in social hierarchies and occu-
pational prestige might be one driving force behind the recent political disruptions that have 
been observed in many post-industrial societies. 
What is more, the hollowing of the middle, i.e. the disappearance of mid-skilled routine 
jobs and the ensuing polarization of the labor market, poses thorny inter-generational issues. 
While routine work has long offered an occupational route that promised secure employment 
and mid-range incomes to workers without college degrees, this trajectory is increasingly a 
thing of the past. For routine workers’ children, the only way to match or surpass their par-
ents’ social position is a job in non-routine cognitive work, which usually requires higher edu-
cation or very good vocational training. If the prospect of social upward mobility for the next 
generation indeed powerfully mitigates political grievances, as Iversen and Soskice (2019) 
suggest in their new book on the rise of the knowledge economy, a generous and broadly ac-
cessible educational system is key to generate a sense of collective progress and insulate demo-
cratic countries against political disruption. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Occupation per Task Group 
Task Group ISCO-88 
Non-Routine 1000, 1120, 1130, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1200, 1210, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 
Cognitive 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1235, 1236, 
 1237, 1239, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 
 2000, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2121, 2122, 2130, 2131, 2139, 2140, 
 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2210, 2211, 2212, 
 2213, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2229, 2300, 2310, 2320, 2330, 2340, 2350, 
 2351, 2352, 2359, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2429, 2430, 
 2431, 2432, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2450, 2451, 2452, 
 2453, 2454, 2455, 2460, 2470, 3000, 3100, 3110, 3111, 3112, 3113, 3114, 
 3115, 3116, 3118, 3119, 3121, 3122, 3130, 3131, 3132, 3133, 3140, 3142, 
 3143, 3144, 3145, 3150, 3151, 3152, 3211, 3212, 3213, 3220, 3222, 3223, 
 3224, 3226, 3229, 3231, 3232, 3300, 3310, 3320, 3330, 3340, 3400, 3410, 
 3411, 3412, 3413, 3414, 3415, 3416, 3417, 3419, 3420, 3421, 3422, 3423, 
 3429, 3432, 3433, 3440, 3441, 3442, 3443, 3449, 3450, 3460, 3470, 3471, 
 3472, 3474, 3475, 3480 
Routine 100, 3430, 3431, 4000, 4100, 4110, 4111, 4112, 4113, 4115, 4120, 4121, 
 4122, 4130, 4131, 4133, 4141, 4142, 4143, 4144, 4190, 4210, 4211, 4212, 
 4213, 4215, 4223, 6110, 6111, 6112, 6121, 6129, 6130, 6141, 6152, 6154, 
 7000, 7110, 7112, 7113, 7124, 7200, 7211, 7212, 7213, 7214, 7215, 7220, 
 7221, 7222, 7223, 7224, 7230, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7240, 7241, 7242, 7244, 
 7245, 7311, 7312, 7313, 7321, 7322, 7324, 7330, 7331, 7340, 7341, 7342, 
 7343, 7344, 7345, 7346, 7410, 7411, 7412, 7413, 7415, 7420, 7421, 7422, 
 7423, 7424, 7430, 7432, 7433, 7434, 7435, 7436, 7437, 7440, 7441, 7442, 
 8000, 8100, 8113, 8120, 8122, 8123, 8124, 8139, 8140, 8142, 8143, 8150, 
 8159, 8160, 8161, 8162, 8163, 8200, 8210, 8211, 8212, 8221, 8222, 8223, 
 8231, 8232, 8240, 8251, 8253, 8260, 8261, 8262, 8264, 8270, 8273, 8274, 
 8275, 8278, 8279, 8280, 8281, 8285, 8290, 8340, 9000, 9133, 9150, 9151, 
 9153, 9160, 9161, 9211, 9300, 9310, 9311 
Non-Routine 3221, 3225, 3227, 3228, 4221, 4222, 5000, 5100, 5110, 5111, 5112, 5113, 
Manual 5120, 5121, 5122, 5123, 5130, 5131, 5132, 5133, 5139, 5140, 5141, 5142, 
 5143, 5149, 5160, 5161, 5162, 5163, 5169, 5210, 5220, 7120, 7121, 7122, 
 7123, 7129, 7130, 7131, 7132, 7133, 7134, 7135, 7136, 7137, 7139, 7141, 
 7143, 8310, 8311, 8312, 8320, 8322, 8323, 8324, 8330, 8332, 8333, 8334, 
 9100, 9113, 9130, 9132, 9140, 9141, 9142, 9152, 9162, 9312, 9313, 9320, 
 9330 
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Table A2: Full Transition Matrix   




N 6137 260 241 82 904 7624 
% 0.805 0.034 0.032 0.011 0.119 1 
Routine N 494 3343 342 83 536 4798 




N 490 289 3047 67 390 4283 
% 0.114 0.067 0.711 0.016 0.091 1 
Source: Swiss Household Panel, 1999-2016 
